29.2.12

We Are Legion | The Story of Anonymous

From WeAreLegionThe Documentary.Com:
We Are Legion: The Story of the Hacktivists is a documentary that takes us inside the world of Anonymous, the radical "hacktivist" collective that has redefined civil disobedience for the digital age. The film explores the historical roots of early hacktivist groups like Cult of the Dead Cow and Electronic Disturbance Theater and then follows Anonymous from 4chan to a full-blown movement with a global reach, one of the most transformative of our time.

 

EXPECT US

27.2.12

Susan Oyama On Development and Evolution

Susan Oyama is a psychologist and philosopher of science, and currently professor emerita at the John Jay College and CUNY Graduate Center in New York. Her 1985 book The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution is regarded as a foundational text in developmental systems theory.

From the eSMCs Summer School 2011, San Sebastián, Spain, 5-9 September, 2011:
Development and Evolution in a World Without Labels
by Susan Oyama

Accounts of development and evolution typically involve complementary notions of prespecification–organismic and environmental ‘labeling,’ if you will. In the case of development these can take the form of genetic programs or instructions and the like, while descriptions of evolution often invoke preexisting environmental demands or problems that organisms must meet.

The traditions of thought informing The Embodied Mind and Developmental Systems Theory (DST) both challenge such ways of conceiving life processes. Yet these traditions sprang from different grounds, and they bring distinctive sensibilities to their overlapping projects. I describe the systemic contingencies of self-organizing systems in DST, pointing out the importance of alternative pathways, both in biological processes and the theorizing they inspire.

   

26.2.12

Shaun Gallagher on Enacted Intentionality

Shaun Gallagher is the Moss Chair of Excellence in Philosophy at The University of Memphis, and one of the leading researchers in the field of embodied and extended cognition.

From the eSMCs Summer School 2011, San Sebastián, Spain, 5-9 September, 2011:
Enactively Extended Intentionality 
by Shaun Gallagher 

I argue that the extended mind hypothesis requires an enactive, neo-pragmatic concept of intentionality if it is to develop proper responses to a variety of objections. This enactive concept of intentionality is based on the phenomenological concept of a bodily (or motor or operative) intentionality outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. I explore the connections between this concept and recent embodied approaches to social cognition.



"We are always constrained by the path we have laid down, but there is no ultimate ground to prescribe the steps that we take ... This groundlessness of laying down a path in walking is the key philosophical issue that remains to be addressed". 
- Varela, Thompson, Rosch (1991), The Embodied Mind.

17.2.12

Exploding Star

This image comes from a very deep Chandra observation of the Tycho supernova 
remnant. Low-energy X-rays (red) in the image show expanding debris from the 
supernova explosion and high energy X-rays (blue) show the blast wave, a shell 
of extremely energetic electrons. These high-energy X-rays show a pattern of X-ray 
"stripes" never previously seen in a supernova remnant.


Description from Space.Com
NASA's Chandra X-ray Observatory spacecraft detected a suprisingly regular pattern of X-rays in a well-known supernova remnant called Tycho. The new observations provide the first direct evidence that a cosmic event can rocket particles to energies 100 times higher than those achieved by Earth's most powerful accelerators, researchers said. The discovery of X-ray "stripes" in the remains of an exploded star may help astronomers learn how some of the highest-energy particles in our galaxy reach their incredible speeds, a new study suggests. The find may also help scientists figure out how some of those super-speedy particles — which are known as cosmic rays, and constantly bombard Earth— are produced, they added. "We’ve seen lots of intriguing structures in supernova remnants, but we’ve never seen stripes before," said study leader Kristoffer Eriksen of Rutgers University in a statement. "This made us think very hard about what’s happening in the blast wave of this powerful explosion."

16.2.12

Oliver Stone and Tariq Ali: On History

In the video below filmmaker Oliver Stone and prominent intellectual and activist Tariq Ali engage in a fascinating discussion on U.S history, culture and foreign affairs in front of an audience at the New York Public Library on January 1, 2012.

 


From the New York Pubic Library: 
ON HISTORY - Pakistani writer and filmmaker TARIQ ALI and film director OLIVER STONE will continue their ongoing discourse about "forgotten--or deliberately buried--episodes" from American history from the US intervention against the Russian Revolution to the ongoing interference of the United States in Pakistani political affairs. In their recent public dialogue, On History, Oliver Stone asks, according to Jon Wiener, "smart questions about the rise and fall of the United States and its empire in the 20th century." In this conversation, the tables are turned as we ask Tariq Ali to kick off with some questions for Oliver Stone, leading into a conversation between them on politics, film, and the untold history of the nation.

14.2.12

Enaction, Episteme and Ecology

Adam Robbert has a new post up (here) responding to Levi Bryant’s recent comments (here) on the differences between Bryant’s onticology and Graham Harman’s object-oriented philosophy.

I urge those interested to go read Bryant’s post as he outlines several key questions that get right at the heart of what a realist metaphysics needs to address, while offering explicit statements about where he and Harman diverge. I believe Levi throws down the gauntlet in this regard, and would appreciate any type of response from Harman, if only to further our understanding of what might be at stake in such considerations. With Bryant’s most recent comments it seems obvious that he continues to move closer to a synthesis of the insights embedded within both process philosophy and object-orientations.

Here I only want to briefly address a few of the issues Adam raises to see if I can clarify in my own thoughts and see where we disagree.

Now I definitely agree with both Adam and Levi on the role of 'enaction' in the genesis of events and objects, but would shy away from relying solely on speculative metaphysics (Whitehead) to describe the operations of any such actually existing instances of enaction. Although I’m not as familiar as I would like to be with Whitehead’s ontology, I see no compelling reason why we should graft such a speculative ontology on to what can be easily understood through empirical investigation of the materials and dynamics involved. I argue that enaction can only be explained with reference to the materiality and expressivity (actual properties) of whatever specifc entities are involved.

For example, the enaction of a football game can be described as the interplay and contingently structured conjunctions of atoms, organisms, leather, nylon, metal, grass, oxygen – each with their own properties – such that a particular state of football affairs, composition, assemblage, or “regime of attraction” emerges. Likewise with, say, neo-liberal ideology; which relies on the confluence and circulation of textbooks, discourses, humans, learned schema, guns, the university of Chicago, vast networks of affiliation between elites, exploitable governance systems in “the third world”, etc. The historicity and particular character of enactions is generated through the activities and relations of specific substances and properties.

Yet Adam writes:
“[K]nowledge (or epistemes in this case) are embodied in specific media (e.g., brains, books, and bytes), are not “other than” those media and, in this way, also share the same ontological qualities as ‘physical’ interactions between, say, tornados and barn doors.” [source]
Although I share Adam’s view that epistemic activities are generated within distributed networks (ecologies) of media and materials, I am still left wondering what justifies the claim that such activities “share the same ontological qualities” as rocks? Epistemic events are enactions involving very different substances and relations than, say, a fireplace ‘event’, as an assemblage of rocks. The properties and qualities which go into these two events, and the emergent conditions they each enact are very different in kind and effect in ways that make all the difference.

I think the problem of understanding the difference between epistemic relations and causal relations is crucial here. ‘Causal’ in this context is meant to refer to structural integrities and material-energetic influences (affect generally) whereas ‘epistemic’ is meant to signal animal imagination and symbolic representations. In this sense, imagining or visualizing or hallucinating punching someone in the face is ontologically different than punching someone in the face. Both the imagining and the punching are Real, but they are deployments of very different capacities.

Put another way, epistemic imagination is qualitatively different than radioactive waste, for example. There is an abstract totemic (projective and imaginal) quality to symbolic apprehension that is not shared by rocks or radioactive waste. Therefore simply equating the properties and capacities of thought with pre-imaginal properties and capacities based on some refication of ontological tendencies does nothing to add to our understanding of the Real. Erasing the differences which obtain here through a type of will to speculation only serves to confound.

My problem with “withdrawal” is based on this distinction. Objects are absolutely withdrawn from our conceptions of them (as Wittgenstein and Derrida both claimed), but are only partially withdrawn from our embodied capacities for directly affecting or intervening in their substantial configurations.

Adam continues:
"Object-oriented philosophy’s account of withdrawal holds true for both ontological and epistemological domains, where the ontic and the epistemic can be distinguished analytically to perform certain philosophical tasks, but are ultimately integrated in the embodiment of beings such that epistemic and cognitive ecosystems are ontologically real in the same way that other ecosystems are." [source
I’m not sure I follow the logic here? Cognitive ecosystems can be considered Real in the same sense as “other ecosystems”, but not in the same “way”. In fact, I would reframe all of this by suggesting, rather, that epistemic activities are features of the very same ecosystems as other entities and assemblages but they embody very distinct properties. Thus animal cognition is generated out of the same ecological circumstances as photosynthesis but the enaction of human cognitive events includes the emergence of imaginal representation in addition to physical processes. Epistemic relations and activities (as emergent capacities) are as Real as other purely physical relations and activities, but not in the same way because each set of activities have intrinsic onto-specific organizations, associations and properties.

To be clear, I don’t oppose epistemology and ontology because how we know is a function of what there is. Epistemic relations are in fact one type of ontological relation - only with distinct properties and operations.

13.2.12

Jane Bennett - Powers of the Hoard

Adam Robberts posted the video below at Knowledge Ecology but I consider it relevant and interesting enough to share here as well. Jane Bennett’s recent work has had a strong influence on my own gathering thoughts. Particularly, I appreciate her call to pay more attention to the active, agentic and potent materiality of things. Her project of cultivating our sensitivities and sensibilities as vibrant material bodies in the world must be part of any movement towards authentic ecological thinking. Let me know what you think.



*Location: Theresa Lang Community and Student Center, Arnhold Hall, 55 West 13th Street, 2nd floor Tuesday, September 13, 2011 6:30 p.m.

The official description from the New School:
How can objects sometimes be vibrant things with an effective presence independent of the words, images, and feelings they may provoke in humans? This question is posed by Political theorist Jane Bennett delivers the inaugural lecture as the Vera List Center for Art and Politics embarks on a two-year exploration of "Thingness," the nature of matter. In the face of virtual realities, social media and disembodied existences, the center's programs will focus on the material conditions of our lives.

Jane Bennet is a professor of Political Science at the Johns Hopkins University. In her latest book Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Duke, 2010), she asks how our politics might approach public concerns were we to seriously consider not just our human experience of things but the things themselves. How is it that things can elide their status as possessions, tools, or aesthetic objects and manifest traces of independence and vitality? Following the tangled threads that link vibrant materialities, human selves, and the "agentic assemblages" they form, Bennett examines what hoarders, people who are preternaturally attuned to "things," can teach us about the agency, causality, and artistry in a world overflowing with stuff. Professor Bennet is a founding member of the journal Theory & Event, and is currently working on a project on over-consumption, new ecologies, and Walt Whitman's materialism.

7.2.12

Daniel Everett on the Pirahã and Happiness Without God

The Pirahã
People Who Define Happiness Without God
by Daniel Everett
 

Above anthropologist Daniel Everett discusses the Pirahã at the 32nd Annual Freedom From Religion Foundation National Convention in Seattle, Washington. (November 7th, 2009)

The Pirahã people (pronounced piɾaˈhã) are an indigenous hunter-gatherer tribe of Amazon natives who mainly live on the banks of the Maici River in Brazil's Amazonas state. As of 2010, they number 420 individuals. The Pirahã people do not call themselves Pirahã but instead the Hi'aiti'ihi, roughly translated as "the straight ones".

Their culture and language have a number of unusual features, however they far from being "primitive". As Daniel Everett points out,
"The Pirahã are supremely gifted in all the ways necessary to ensure their continued survival in the jungle: they know the usefulness and location of all important plants in their area; they understand the behavior of local animals and how to catch and avoid them; and they can walk into the jungle naked, with no tools or weapons, and walk out three days later with baskets of fruit, nuts, and small game."
Members of the Pirahã can whistle their language, which is how the tribe's men communicate when hunting in the jungle.

6.2.12

On Agency - Part 1: Objects Potent and Active

nano-image of animal protein
Levi Bryant is at it again. In a recent series of posts Bryant articulates beautifully the nuances involved in thinking things as both process and substance simultaneously. Bryant argues that the substantiality of ‘objects’ is the thing’s activity. That is, objects or assemblages are acts.

Plenty of interesting arguments could follow this insight - some of which I’m not sure Levi would be comfortable with - but his main point is important, and, i believe, the crux of the neo-materialist position. Things are primordially active, energetic and contingent evental endurances – they are actualities. The vibrancy of matter-energy itself speaks to the inherent sensuality of existence: the world-flesh. And to understand ‘objects’ we can’t simply index their ontological semblances, rather what is required is the cultivation of our primate sensibilities (sensitivities) to affect more intimate relations with all those intrinsic powers and ontic specificities embodied by actually existing entities. The identity of the object/act is, then, an expression of each assemblage’s dynamic potency.
Agency is ‘doing’ or ‘being’ in its intra-activity. It is the enactment of iterative changes to particular practices-interative reconfigurings of topological manifolds of spacetimematter relations- through the dynamics of intra-activity.” (Barad, 2007, p.178).
Below are two excerpts from Bryant’s posts I believe exemplify the main issues. To be sure, I agree with every single statement shared here:
 “[T]he core of existence lies in activity. Existence as activity enjoys both an epistemological and ontological priority. Epistemologically, it is only through the acts of a thing that we can ever come to know the being of a thing. Ontologically it is only through the acts of a thing that a thing endures. In both cases, however, it cannot be said that objects are static or unchanging things. To be is to act and to act is to move and change.” [source]   
“Objects don’t act. To say that objects act would be to say that there is something, objects, that either act or do not act. But if there is no doer behind or underneath the deed, then we must say rather that objects are acts. The substantiality of substance is the substance’s activity. Likewise, we cannot suggest that substances or objects are products of becomings… because the substantiality of a substance is not a product or outcome of becomings or activities, but rather the substances are their activity. There isn’t first one thing, becomings or activities, and then another thing, objects that are the result of these activities. There is just the one thing, these activities, that is the substantiality of the substance. The idea that the objecthood of a substance is a product of a becoming that precedes it is premised on an arbitrary and subjective cessation of activity on the part of one who observes a substance that is not itself reflected in nature. Rather, when activity ceases so too does substance cease.” [source
I relate all this to what I have said previously [here]: every assemblage or object is a “material-affective substantiality with capacities unique to its individual existence. Such inherent substantial capacities are precisely what I call potency. And it is this general potency of existing entities which theorists refer to when they talk about a thing’s ‘agency’.”

5.2.12

Laruelle on Truth and Philosophy

The following essay by the ‘non-philosopher’ François Laruelle is the only work of his I have read. My interest in this particular thinker flows from my interactions with Anthony Paul Smith and my intitial absorptions of the work of Ray Brassier.

On the surface what I like about Laruelle is his appeal to the immanence of thought and his intention to move beyond the insular self-reflective tendencies of academic theory. Human thought takes place within a vast ecology of things, discourses, practices and consequences. Attempts to bind critical thinking to traditional genres and logical systems is a violent act against creativity.

Consider this a sign of what will no doubt be an ongoing investigation: 
The Truth According to Hermes: Theorems on the Secret and Communication
By François Laruelle
Non-philosophy hinges on a rejection of what Laruelle calls the philosophical decision. To engage in the philosophical decision is to endorse the position that anything and everything is a candidate for philosophical reflection. Thus to do philosophy means to reflect on the world, and likewise if one is being philosophical, one is necessarily being reflective or meta-philosophical. Non-philosophy means simply to refuse such a decision. In other words non-philosophy refuses to reflect on things. Instead non-philosophy withdraws from the decision, and in doing so enters into a space of what Laruelle calls science. As John Mullarkey describes it, Laruelle is “abstaining from philosophy as such while simultaneously taking it as its own raw material.” - Alexander R. Galloway
The unitary or dominant way of thinking is that of a generalized hermeneutics, a hermeto-logy. The economy of hermetology and its most general structure are both those of a “difference.” Hermeto-logical Difference is the indissoluble correlation, the undecidable coupling of truth and its communication. It postulates that truth needs meaning, that meaning and presence—as differentiated and sought after as they may be—belong to the essence of truth, that the secret and the logos, the secret and its manifestation are reciprocally necessary and are mutually determined.
The hermeto-logical circle is deeper and more original than the “hermeneutic circle.” Hermeto-logical Difference is a fundamental invariant, a matrix for what is called “metaphysics” in general. It is more powerful than its modalities or avatars, among which the hermeneutic conflict of interpretations, as well as the textual and signifying critique within hermeneutics, and all possible theories of communication. The conflict between Being and Dasein, between truth and the meaning of Being is itself one of the modalities of a more general conflict, that between the secret—the supposed secret—and logos. Hermeto-logical Difference programs, predraws, and teleologically orders all its modalities. It is their internal and external boundary, continually redrawn.
Read More: Here
Peter Paul Rubens, Mercury and a Sleeping Herdsman

4.2.12

Ray Brassier on Wilfred Sellars and Animal Inferences

How to Train an Animal that Makes Inferences: Sellars on Rules and Regularities:

 

A juicy exchange between The Žižek and Brassier starting around 1:18:00 to about 1:32:00ish.

3.2.12

the mad ones


“The only people for me are the mad ones, the ones who are mad to live,
mad to talk, mad to be saved…
the ones who never yawn
or say a commonplace thing,
but burn, burn, burn,
like fabulous yellow roman candles
exploding like spiders across the stars.” 
~ Jack Kerouac, On the Road
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