@Dirk - That paper is basically a plagiarized summary of remarks made in much more detail by Mark Johnson in "The Meaning of the Body" (2008). In fact the author lifts whole sentences from pages 73-79 from Johnson without quotation marks or citation.
Dewey, James, Picasso, oh my!
Regardless, the point Dewey makes about the "pervasive quality" of experience as background horizon for the appearance of objects is a fundamental one. The world hits us DIRECTLY in our bodyminds (through the various potencies at work in any given situation) but often only PARTIALLY (because of our determinable capacities for perception and translation).
Harman might learn to temper his Heideggerian fancies if he read more Dewey...
I wonder what you think of the point Dewey makes about the "pervasive quality" of experience as background horizon for the appearance of objects? I believe his notion that experience is pervaded with the qualitative effervescence emanating from the world is a fundamental one. There is a directness in the experience of the background that acts as the context for punctuated forces such as "objects" to even appear to us. And when we trace this (immanent) context we find that no punctuated event (object) comes into being without the fundamental support and 'sustenance' of the cosmic/material/energetic and pre-individual processes which produced it.
In my view, then, the "pervasiveness" and force of the general experience of humans anchors an awareness of the fact that the various potencies at work in the world strike us DIRECTLY in our constituent body minds (via particular "situations" as Dewey might put it), but only PARTIALLY because of our limited (yet affording) capacities for perception and translation.
Regardless, I definitely like the idea of Dewey's thought seeping into the object/process debates.
well I guess MJ could be plagiarizing himself in that article, but he was the author/presenter in question. I would say, with Dewey, that our experiences are ALWAYS PARTIAL. This is where Dewey takes the proper anthropological/post-darwinian turn away from his Hegel/Geist-haunted roots and embraces instrumentalism/practices, which I think that Harman would find objectionable just as Heidegger dismissed "mere" anthropology, but as I posted at KE I dont see any other possibility for human-beings: http://knowledge-ecology.com/2011/09/05/high-definition-philosophy-part-1/ also see excellent articles by Rabinow and Vincent Colapietro and others: http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/issue/current/showToc
@Dirk. LOL. I didn't even notice that. Goes to show that I care less about the who than the what.
Johnson's work resonates deeply with me. I think we need more naturalistic pragmatism.
Would this needed focus on praxis then lead us to Badiou's 'event'? Or does Whitehead's 'actual occasions' capture it better? I know little Badiou so it really is an open question.
I wouldn't mind stretching Foucault a bit further in a direction that might link his power/knowledge analytic with a Schelling-inspired "powers" ontology. Powers here framed as affective capacities inherent to specific assemblages (or what Foucault might term dispotif).
Of course all this could then be looked at in relation to the work Rabinow is leading, which you know more about than I. Provevi's political affect program and Connolly's becoming also hover around the kind of speculative 'wilderness' thinking I'm interested in.
I see no reason not to extend Foucault (and I would add Rorty) in such ways, see what you think of Schatzki. I like Protevi's work on extended/emergent subject-ivity until he starts (like Levi) in on speculating about, making up, social/collective "bodies". have you read Ian's: http://www.bogost.com/writing/process_vs_procedure.shtml I really like Connolly's lectures but not sure how it ties in to actual practices/experiments, does he write about this?
8 comments:
dewey's zen: the 'Oh' of wonder:
http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SAAP/USC/DP17.html
-dmf
@Dirk - That paper is basically a plagiarized summary of remarks made in much more detail by Mark Johnson in "The Meaning of the Body" (2008). In fact the author lifts whole sentences from pages 73-79 from Johnson without quotation marks or citation.
Dewey, James, Picasso, oh my!
Regardless, the point Dewey makes about the "pervasive quality" of experience as background horizon for the appearance of objects is a fundamental one. The world hits us DIRECTLY in our bodyminds (through the various potencies at work in any given situation) but often only PARTIALLY (because of our determinable capacities for perception and translation).
Harman might learn to temper his Heideggerian fancies if he read more Dewey...
As I posted at Jason Hills site:
I wonder what you think of the point Dewey makes about the "pervasive quality" of experience as background horizon for the appearance of objects? I believe his notion that experience is pervaded with the qualitative effervescence emanating from the world is a fundamental one. There is a directness in the experience of the background that acts as the context for punctuated forces such as "objects" to even appear to us. And when we trace this (immanent) context we find that no punctuated event (object) comes into being without the fundamental support and 'sustenance' of the cosmic/material/energetic and pre-individual processes which produced it.
In my view, then, the "pervasiveness" and force of the general experience of humans anchors an awareness of the fact that the various potencies at work in the world strike us DIRECTLY in our constituent body minds (via particular "situations" as Dewey might put it), but only PARTIALLY because of our limited (yet affording) capacities for perception and translation.
Regardless, I definitely like the idea of Dewey's thought seeping into the object/process debates.
http://immanenttranscedence.blogspot.com/2011/09/anti-monodology.html
well I guess MJ could be plagiarizing himself in that article, but he was the author/presenter in question.
I would say, with Dewey, that our experiences are ALWAYS PARTIAL. This is where Dewey takes the proper anthropological/post-darwinian turn away from his Hegel/Geist-haunted roots and embraces instrumentalism/practices, which I think that Harman would find objectionable just as Heidegger dismissed "mere" anthropology, but as I posted at KE I dont see any other possibility for human-beings:
http://knowledge-ecology.com/2011/09/05/high-definition-philosophy-part-1/
also see excellent articles by Rabinow and Vincent Colapietro and others:
http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/issue/current/showToc
http://www.csu.edu.au/research/ripple/publications/publications/Schatzki-110721-Primer-on-Practices.pdf
http://www.csu.edu.au/research/ripple/pep/schatzki/110609-Edge-of-Change.pdf
http://www.focusing.org/gendlin/audio/gol_2178_audio.html
@Dirk. LOL. I didn't even notice that. Goes to show that I care less about the who than the what.
Johnson's work resonates deeply with me. I think we need more naturalistic pragmatism.
Would this needed focus on praxis then lead us to Badiou's 'event'? Or does Whitehead's 'actual occasions' capture it better? I know little Badiou so it really is an open question.
I wouldn't mind stretching Foucault a bit further in a direction that might link his power/knowledge analytic with a Schelling-inspired "powers" ontology. Powers here framed as affective capacities inherent to specific assemblages (or what Foucault might term dispotif).
Of course all this could then be looked at in relation to the work Rabinow is leading, which you know more about than I. Provevi's political affect program and Connolly's becoming also hover around the kind of speculative 'wilderness' thinking I'm interested in.
I see no reason not to extend Foucault (and I would add Rorty) in such ways, see what you think of Schatzki.
I like Protevi's work on extended/emergent subject-ivity until he starts (like Levi) in on speculating about, making up, social/collective "bodies".
have you read Ian's:
http://www.bogost.com/writing/process_vs_procedure.shtml
I really like Connolly's lectures but not sure how it ties in to actual practices/experiments, does he write about this?
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