"The world is its best representation." - Rodney BrooksAlva Noë is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. The main focus of his work is the theory of perception and consciousness. 'Externalism' about cognition and mental content is a pervasive theme in his work. In addition to these problems in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, he interested in phenomenology, the theory of art, Wittgenstein, and the origins of analytic philosophy. He is the author of the books Varieties of Presence (2012), Out of Our Heads (2009) and Action In Perception (2004).
I highly recommend all Noë's work as it mixes an exquisite blend of scientific rigor with highly sophisticated philosophical consideration. Noë argues that the way we frame the question of consciousness - the notions of 'mind', 'meaning' and neural substrates - muddles our understanding of what is basically an activity generated in the "complex causal dynamic interaction between brains, bodies and environments". Noë work shows how sentient agents are never self-contained units of awareness but rather open living systems which only ever enact conscious experience in conjunction with the affording dynamic circumstances in which they exist. This understanding of sentience has major implications for how we conceptualize the autonomy of agents and challenges the basis of contemporary politics and social design.
Noë from 'Home Sweet Home: Finding Ourselves', NPR, May 28, 2011:
“Consciousness isn’t something that happens; it is something we do or make. And like everything else that we do, it depends both on the way we are constituted — on our brains and bodies — but also on the world around us.
Looking for consciousness in the brain is like looking for dance in the legs. (…)
Both Cartesian dualism, with its insistence that the mind is separate from the body, and the contemporary dogma that that the thing inside us that thinks and feels is the brain, share a common premise: that there is a thing inside that thinks and feels and decides and is conscious. It is this assumption, shared by dualist and most neuroscientists alike, that really holds us captive. (…)
There is as of yet no consensus on what a science of human or animal experience should even look like. I propose that what limits us, and what limits our science, is a dual misunderstanding. The first I have already indicated: we suppose that mind is in the head. No, we need to get out of our heads to understand the workings of the mind, to look at the way the animal is closely coupled to and involved with its environment. (…)
We confuse the fabulous success of modern physics with grounds for believing that we live in the world that physics describes. And then we are confronted with the fact that the world of the physicist is a world devoid of colors and sounds and textures and odors and all the other qualities that fill up our experience. This tends to throw us back on our brains again: if the world isn’t really the way we experience it as being, then our experience must be something we confabulate, or that our brains confabulate for us. Back to the Cartesian capsule! (…)
The basic laws of physics that support life are well understood; but this does not imply that we understand, in the terms of physics, how there is life!
The thing is: we do not live in the world of physics. If that were so, then there would be no biology at all. No, humans and other animals live in niches. They, or rather, we, occupy landscapes of values — worlds made up not of quantum lattice structures, but of opportunities and obstacles, affordances and hinderances. Life, including our experiential lives, happen not in clouds of atoms, but on level ground, with others, surrounded by hiding places, food, friends and enemies.
It is there, where we find ourselves, that we find the stage of our active lives and our active experience. We actually have the resources we need to understand ourselves. It is two dogmas of now antiquated modern science — that mind is in the head, and that the world is devoid of meaning unless we, or our brains, give it meaning — that creates the illusion — a meta-cognitive illusion! — that there is a hard problem of consciousness we are unable to solve.”
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http://www.nypl.org/audiovideo/william-forsythe-alva-no%C3%AB
left this over @ AJ's and think it ties in here as well:
The character truest to itself becomes eccentric rather than immovably centered, as Emerson defined the noble character of the hero. At the edge, the certainty of borders gives way. We are more subject to invasions, less able to mobilize defenses, less sure of who we really are, even as we may be perceived by others as a person of character. The dislocation of self from center to indefinite edge merges us more with the world, so that we can feel “blest by everything.”
-James Hillman
The contemporary dance of today, which stands in the tradition of the modern dance of the 1920s and 30s, may be described as an artistic practice that moves on the borders to other disciplines; a practice that seeks the permeability of disciplinary membranes and is precisely thus capable of meeting philosophy as an equal through the oscillating of thought movements and dance movements.
Contemporary dance no longer serves as a metaphor for thought, but rather presents itself as a sensuous and intellectual thinking in a body. Dance is therefore a kind of knowledge on the basis of which man can be understood. Dance shows in the clearest possible way how meaning emerges situatively and performatively in the sensuous (perceptible). The body, or to apply a concept proposed by phenomenology, the lived body, has the ability to think and to produce and represent meaning: “A reflective and thinking body is constantly dancing its becoming”, writes Jean-Luc Nancy.
Thinking in bodies lays the foundation, as for example Miriam Fischer and Jean-Luc Nancy have proposed, for a philosophy of dance, which focuses on the genesis of meaning in the sensuous, the theory of the subject and the meaning of philosophy. A philosophy that sees itself as dancing ranges through themes in anthropology, the theory of meaning and aesthetics, and combines methodological approaches from modern metaphysics, life philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics, ontology and deconstruction.
- Susanne Traub 2009. http://www.goethe.de/ges/phi/eth/en8820849.htm
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_bMYMX7oO8
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