3.12.10

Call for Submissions - Blog Carnival: The Four Stone Hearth

Who the hell would let me host a blog carnival? Oh, wait, it's official: on December 8, 2010 Archive Fire will be hosting the 107th edition of the Four Stone Hearth anthropology blog carnival! I'm honored, excited and now taking submissions from all you anthro-heads out there ready to rock blogosphere. If you have a post you want mentioned please send me a link asap. Or if you know of any recent anthropologically inclined blog offerings you think deserve mention feel free to let me know.


Here is the official description for the event:
The Four Stone Hearth is a blog carnival that specializes in anthropology in the widest (American) sense of that word. Here, anthropology is the study of humankind, throughout all times and places, focusing primarily on four lines of research:
  • archaeology
  • socio-cultural anthropology
  • bio-physical anthropology
  • linguistic anthropology
Each one of these subfields is a stone in our hearth. Four Stone Hearth is published bi-weekly, Wednesdays in odd-number weeks.
It should be epic.

1.12.10

Conjuring the Gap

In a beautifully written post over at Menticulture Joe Flintham makes the following comments with regard to Graham Harman’s notion of “withdrawal”:
"I just want to dispel hidden realities which betray their appearances, or illusory facades which belie some more authentic realm... I don't want to bridge the abyss: I want to obviate the need for the bridge by unconjuring the abyss - closing the gap."
I completely agree. The world is much more intimate than the gap-conjurers would have us believe. The distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities only exists if you rely on a 17th century theory of cognition. And the distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ only appears if we privilege ocular experience over our other sensual capacities. Full-bodied human experience is neither merely visual nor reliant on some metaphysical distinct realm of the sensual in its contact with the world. What the gap-conjurers fail to appropriate is our contemporary knowledge of how human awareness is embodied, extended and deeply visceral. We directly encounter and experience other things through our bodies, through our flesh. Interacting entities are thus collisions between the inherent properties of relatively distinct objects and the capacities they individually embody. And all such 'collisions' are catalytic events with variable affects.

Such intimate contact between things is revealed everywhere. Our bodies have an ancestral continuity with stars, geological formations, bacteria, minerals, cellular communities, etc, that can afford earthly things direct access to each other. For example, objects can penetrate us and we them. Entities can be literally absorbed by us and we them. There is a dark creeping intimacy between all living and non-living beings that cannot be ontologized away. We are all of this world.

However such access is never complete. Our fleshy encounters are only partial because each entity retreats into its individuality – as realized in its material and organizational depths. The individuality of an existent being is an expression of that being’s organized extensive properties and intensive relations. And these rambling assemblages of temporal properties and relations can be said to “withdraw” into the depths of their onto-specific structural complexity, which makes it hard for us to contact or experience them in their entirety.

Likewise, ‘withdrawal’ is also only ever partial precisely because all objects/assemblages remain intertwined, embedded, supported and in contact with the world. All objects come from the same ever-present background. That is to say, all individualities are intimately of this world - emboded immanent properties and relations that can, for the most part, be touched, investigated and intervened upon given the right methods or tools. 

Take, for example, the encounter between an apple and a horse. An apple is partially ‘withdrawn’ from a horse who holds it in its teeth because the teeth of the horse are only in contact with the skin of the apple, leaving the inner non-skin parts of the apple “hidden” and temporarily in excess of the horses bite. It is in this sense that the horse can be said to be in direct contact with the real apple, but not in its entirety. There are aspects of the apple that are partially withdrawn. Yet when the horse bites into the apple a deeper kind of access is granted, and the apple’s individuality has been compromised. And when the horse subsequently begins to digest the apple the very distinction between the apple and the horse begins to break down. In this case the interaction between apple and horse seemlessly evolves from a) partial contact and withdrawnness to b) deeper disclosure and access, and eventually to c) total absorption and disintegration in a way that completely obviates the need to posit an unbridgeable ‘gap’ between either the two objects ‘in themselves’, or between the horse’s encounter with the apple and its experience of that encounter. In an intimately enmeshed and complicated cosmos these things often touch, mix and mingle in ways that are specific to what they in fact are.

Similarly, there is no good reason why we should conjure a gap between the real and the sensual. And we need only look at one more concrete example to understand why. Take, for example, when two humans interact and shake hands. When people shake hands they make direct but partial contact via their epidermal extensions (skin), while at the same time the ‘totality’ of each person’s individuality remains more rather than less ‘withdrawn’. Such contact triggers a cascade of reactions from the extensive properties and capacities of the skin throughout the body and central nervous system that eventually affects the wider self-system and governing dynamics of the individuals involved, and in very specific ways – depending on the biology, personality, memories, cultural leanings, dramaturgical background and intentions of each individual. This cascade of direct but partial contact and affective stimulation is a more or less intimate experiential event that, again, completely obviates the need to conjure up a distinct and mediating sensual realm outside of 'the real' where "vicars" bridge the gap between encounters and experience. Our worldly (actual) properties mingle directly but partially with the relatively withdrawn or undisclosed worldly (actual) properties of the other person. And the same goes with all objects. The mix and mingle (and sometimes mangle) of objects is always direct (immanent) and partial (withdrawn).

And to reiterate, in the context of the hand-shake example, just because two people contact and experience each other directly on an immanent plane of actuality, or a shared worldliness (of hand-shaking), doesn't mean that they necessarily experience each other completely (e.g., simultaneously having access to each other’s spleens, brain stems, bones, etc.). Their encounter is direct but partial precisely because there are aspects of each other’s individuality that are structurally withdrawn.

It is in this sense that I suggest objects do in fact “withdraw” but are also partially vulnerable to direct intervention and contact with other objects. There are points of contact between things even while things themselves are partially structurally withdrawn from each other.

29.11.10

Harman and Shaviro: Between Philosophers, Processes and Things

Phil Sheffield, 2009
Shaviro just can’t help himself. It looks like the coming Metaphysics and Things conference will occasion more debate between philosophers Steven Shaviro and Graham Harman on the relative merits of their respective positions. As well it should be.

Much to the dismay of many I have always believed that without serious and sustained debate philosophy becomes nothing more than the meandering speculations of an educated elite class. Engaging in ‘public’ dialogue and critical analysis is the only way interested parties can gain a deeper appreciation of the merits of differing ‘logics’ and worldviews. And philosophy as wisdom-philia belongs to all of us or it belongs to none of us. The culture of gentlemanly [sic] agreements to disagree thus only serves those professional discourse producers who want to be left alone to build edifices for their own sake, contributing consciously or otherwise to the superfluous proliferation of systems, frameworks and theory in the ecology of thought.

But every healthy ecology has inherent limits, boundaries and zones of organization. And within every healthy ecology we witness natural selection. So too it should be within the ecology of ideas (philosophy being one sub-niche among others). Without limiting forces, competition and the struggle for attention between concepts and frameworks what we begin to get is a wildly overreaching and pathologically abundant realm where more ‘fit’ (clearer and affective) ideas are indistinguishable from the superfluous and redundant mutant variations.

Thinking critically is not just about patting each other on the backs for each other’s accomplishments, while maintaining sometimes directly opposing views (although respect and appreciation are key), but about logical clarification and important matters of emphasis. In short, if theorists agree not to ‘struggle’ (for personal and/or professional reasons) with each other’s worldview then, ultimately, it is the rest of us – those left to make their way within various niches of thinking – who end up losing. So please, fellas, tell us what you really think!

That said, I think there are very significant insights to be gleaned from both Shaviro's and Harman’s ontology – as evidenced in the two brilliant posts (here and here) these comments are based on. They are both fantastic thinkers and particularly talented writers. I agree with Harman that things “withdraw” (but I suggest only partially, and never entirely), and also with Shaviro that process is the only supportable way of learning how things come to be and cease to be. In this respect, Harman and Shaviro each have important things to teach us - and their continued philosophical dialogue (‘struggle’) will only help us all think a little clearer.

Below are a few morsels from their recent posts, in their own words. First from Steven Shaviro:
The parts of OOO that I reject are the claims 1) that objects are “substances,” and that they are somehow “withdrawn,” and 2) that (in Graham’s version, if not in Levi’s) causality is problematic, and can only be conceived “vacariously,” through a version of occasionalism.

Another way to put this is to say that what I find valuable and inspiring about OOO are the questions it asks, which I think are necessary and important ones; rather than its particular answers to these questions, which I don’t accept…

Of course terms are never entirely defined by their relations; and terms can disentangle themselves from some relations, and enter into others instead. But at the same time (and here I explicitly disagree with Graham) no term can ever disentangle itself from all relations. That is simply impossible.
Read the entire post, which provides much more detail, here.

And from Graham Harman:
If realities themselves are imperfectly translatable into knowledge, they are imperfectly translatable into relations of any sort. This is why vicarious causation is needed. Moreover, this is a battle I will eventually win, because strange though the idea sounds, it is absolutely compelling once you see the problem clearly; I think I’ve simply failed to make a game-ending presentation of the point so far, and as a result have only convinced a certain number of people. This is due to my own limitations, but to some extent it is possible to outgrow one’s limitations…

“But at the same time (and here I explicitly disagree with Graham) no term can ever disentangle itself from all relations. That is simply impossible.”

Why?

And furthermore: “rather, I think we should follow William James and Deleuze in seeing a continual florescence of external relations, and of seeing these relations as in themselves perfectly real, as being just as real as the terms they connect are real.”

But I also see them as perfectly real. They simply don’t affect their terms (at least not automatically).

For example, the external relations among parts of a bicycle are perfectly real for me. They form an object: a bicycle.

But the point is that the new entity known as the bicycle need not affect the internal constitution of its parts. In fact it often does, but this is a special case that needs to be explained, not an automatic influence.
Read Graham's entire post here. On the question of “why” it is impossible to consider entities totally withdrawn from their relations, I think Steven continues to be quite clear here [and here]:
Deprive me of my relation to oxygen and I die; but my body persists as a thing, and interacts with bacteria that dissolve and eat it. Send my dead body into outer space so that it escapes the bacteria, and it will still be altered by cosmic radiation and other phenomena of interstellar space. Every change in relations turns the term into something different.
Regardless of what I believe re: these specific issues, I think it is safe to say that having these two thinkers mix it up a little is a welcome and much needed development for speculative realists of all kinds. Go read both posts ASAP.

In addition, and just because I enjoy his work so much, here is a small sample of Jeffrey Bell’s recent riff on Deleuze beyond vitalism - generated in relation to both Shaviro and Harman’s posts (discussed above):
Philosophy itself is defined by Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari as the creation of concepts, and concepts are not, in sharp contrast to Bergson, intuitions whereby one seizes, as Bergson put it, the ‘one reality…from within.’ To the contrary, concepts are for Deleuze assemblages that are at best to be understood as filtered selected assemblages that stave off an excess that would be the undoing of concepts, and this excess is not to be confused with a ‘pure vitality,’ a Bergsonian flux. I am led to this conclusion from my reading of the closing lines of A Thousand Plateaus:
Every abstract machine is linked to other abstract machines, not only because they are inseparably political, economic, scientific, artistic, ecological, cosmic–perceptive, affective, active, thinking, physical, and semiotic–but because their various types are as intertwined as their operation are convergent. Mechanosphere.
Rather than a pure flux, there is a ‘mechanosphere,’ an assemblage of abstract machines that forever risk being undermined by relations that exceed them (since the relations are external to their terms), and it is this excess or exteriority of relations that would be the undoing of concepts and assemblages rather than a pure Bergsonian flux. For Deleuze, then, rather than a mystical intuition that grasps the one reality, we have the effort to create an assemblage of heterogeneous elements, or a composition to use Latour’s terms, and this effort is an experimental effort that is not guaranteed of success.
You gotta love Big Theory.

26.11.10

Dark Days Ahead?

When you combine the news that 2010 was the hottest year recorded since humans started recording, that carbon emissions continue to rise globally, that pubic "skepticism" of global warming is on the rise, and that there has been a 40% decline of phytoplankton (the core of the global food chain) in the world's ocean since 1950, to cite just a few recent developments, it is hard not to completely give up hope.

At this point I have no doubt that our species is creating a future world where tremendous suffering will be our everyday reality. Is it now time to start focusing exclusively on survival after the collapse? Is it time to start thinking and acting post-apocalyptically? Let's be honest people.

this story was swiped from Tim Morton's blog:
The Next Crash Will Be Ecological - and Nature Doesn't Do Bailouts

Why are the world's governments bothering? Why are they jetting to Cancun next week to discuss what to do now about global warming? The vogue has passed. The fad has faded. Global warming is yesterday's apocalypse. Didn't somebody leak an email that showed it was all made up? Doesn't it sometimes snow in the winter? Didn't Al Gore get fat, or molest a masseur, or something?

Alas, the biosphere doesn't read Vogue. Nobody thought to tell it that global warming is so 2007. All it knows is three facts. 2010 is globally the hottest year since records began [source]. 2010 is the year humanity's emissions of planet-warming gases reached its highest level ever [source]. And exactly as the climate scientists predicted, we are seeing a rapid increase in catastrophic weather events, from the choking of Moscow by gigantic unprecedented forest fires to the drowning of one quarter of Pakistan.

Before the Great Crash of 2008, the people who warned about the injection of huge destabilizing risk into our financial system seemed like arcane, anal bores. Now we all sit in the rubble and wish we had listened. The great ecological crash will be worse, because nature doesn't do bailouts.

That's what Cancun should be about -- surveying the startling scientific evidence, and developing an urgent plan to change course. The Antarctic -- which locks of 90 percent of the world's ice -- has now seen eight of its ice shelves fully or partially collapse [source]. The world's most distinguished climate scientists, after recordings like this, say we will face a three to six feet rise in sea level this century [source] . That means the drowning of London, Bangkok, Venice, Cairo and Shanghai, and entire countries like Bangladesh and the Maldives...

Perhaps the most startling news story of the year passed almost unnoticed [source]. Plant plankton (phytoplankton) are tiny creatures that live in the oceans and carry out a job you and I depend on to stay alive. They produce half the world's oxygen, and suck up planet-warming carbon dioxide. Yet this year, one of the world's most distinguished scientific journals, Nature, revealed that 40 percent of them have been killed by the warming of the oceans since 1950. Professor Boris Worm, who co-authored the study, said in shock: "I've been trying to think of a biological change that's bigger than this and I can't think of one." That has been the result of less than one degree of warming. Now we are on course for at least three degrees this century.
Read More @ The Huffington Post

24.11.10

Ahmed Rashid: Descent into Chaos

I just finished Rashid's 2008 book Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. It was a detailed account of the tragedies and developments in Central Asia by someone who was there 'on the ground' when the misguided military interventions in that region began. It was a fascinating read.

The Amazon description:
Ahmed Rashid is the voice of reason amid the chaos of Central Asia today. His unique knowledge of this complex, war-torn region gives him a panoramic vision and grasp of nuance that no Western writer can emulate. In Descent Into Chaos, Rashid reviews the regional conditions since 9/11 and the catastrophic aftermath of America’s failed war on terror. The underlying theme is clear, devastating and deeply critical of current U.S. foreign policy. Iraq is essentially a sideshow. Pakistan and Afghanistan are where the war really began. Pakistan remains the crucial resource and key player, and Afghanistan is where the fight against Islamic insurgency is eventually going to be played out.
Ahmed Rashid احمد رشید (b. 1948) is a former Pakistani revolutionary, a journalist and best-selling author of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.

Below are two interviews with Rashid (conducted in 2001 and 2008) and a link to an talk he gave at the World Affairs Council in Washington DC in 2009:

December 19, 2001:


June 10, 2008:


Ahmed Rashid: Descent into Chaos (2009)

22.11.10

Class Wars Rage On

From Forbes Magazine: 261 Millionaires in US Congress
Jam the Consumer Culture
Saying that money and politics go hand in hand would be stating the obvious, but a study released by the Center for Responsive Politics takes it further. In 2009, nearly half of Congress, 261 to be exact, are millionaires, 55 of them boast personal fortunes of more than $10 million, and 8 of them pass the $100 million mark. Only 1% of all Americans have the pleasure of a bank account with more than $1 million.[source]    
H/T to Adrian Ivakhiv for the article.
Members of Congress are enjoying their own financial stimulus. Despite a stubbornly sour national economy congressional members’ personal wealth collectively increased by more than 16 percent between 2008 and 2009, according to a new study by the Center for Responsive Politics of federal financial disclosures released earlier this year. [source]
And in case you missed it:

“…executives at a handful of finance firms will be paid a record $144 billion, according to a new survey by the Wall Street Journal.”
When will you rebel?

18.11.10

Merleau-Ponty, Agency and Embodied Cognition

In many of his writings philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) identifies two opposing notions of consciousness that characterize our thinking: one construes consciousness as radically different from the world - epitomized by both the concepts of a Cartesian soul and the Kantian transcendental ego. The other view identifies consciousness with some lump of physical matter such as the brain, nervous system, or body. It holds that the doings of consciousness can be fully explained by appealing to causal laws. This conception is found in 'scientific' thinking about subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty however rejects both notions.

Merleau-Ponty suggests that what we ordinarily think of as mental states and activities are constituted by bodily engagement with the world. The subject of these states and activities is thus essentially embodied. But to understand this form of bodily subjectivity, we need to reject the traditional idea of the body as a mere object, a piece of biological mechanism, which somehow contains consciousness within it. Instead, Merleau-Ponty argues, we need to recognize that the body is a form of consciousness - a living sentient enitity. And, since it is the body's interactions with the world that generate our mental states and activities, consciousness is not separate from its environment. It is essentially embedded within it.

Moreover, Merleau-Ponty argues that the two flawed conceptions of consciousness go hand-in-hand with two notions of 'the world'. One takes the world to be constituted by the subject. Merleau-Ponty sees the transcendental idealism of Kant and the early Husserl as exemplifying this position. The other construes the world as existing independently of consciousness, which is just one of many things within it. This view is supposedly endorsed by the natural sciences. Merleau-Ponty rejects both of these conceptions as well.

Below is a draft of a paper to be delivered to The Aristotelian Society on November 22, 2010 by Komarine Romdenh-Romluc in which she explores Merleau-Ponty's alternative conception of embodied human agency and consciouness rooted in a dynamic interaction with the environment. Enjoy:
Agency and Embodied Cognition
By Komarine Romdenh-Romluc

The dominant account of agency takes actions to be brought about and guided by intentions that represent the agent’s performance of the action. Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative view that denies intentions are essential for action. He holds instead that the agent’s activity is brought about by her apprehension of her environment, without the need for any intervening thoughts that represent her performance of it. I argue that two considerations advanced in favour of the thesis that human cognition is embodied are in tension with the dominant account of agency, and speak in favour of Merleau-Ponty’s view.
Read More (PDF) @ The Aristotelian Society

17.11.10

Inuit Knowledge and Climate Change

Nunavut-based director Zacharias Kunuk (Atanarjuat The Fast Runner) and researcher and filmmaker Dr. Ian Mauro (Seeds of Change) have teamed up with Inuit communities to document their knowledge and experience regarding climate change. This new documentary, the world’s first Inuktitut language film on the topic, takes the viewer “on the land” with elders and hunters to explore the social and ecological impacts of a warming Arctic:



Learn More @ Isuma.Tv

15.11.10

Protevi: Mind in Life, Mind in Process

.
Mind in Life, Mind in Process: Towards a New Transcendental Aesthetic and a New Question of Panpsychism

By John Protevi

"The essay examines the idea of “biological space and time” found in Evan Thompson‘s Mind in Life and Gilles Deleuze‘s Difference and Repetition. Tracking down this “new Transcendental Aesthetic” intersects new work done on panpsychism. Both Deleuze and Thompson can be fairly said to be biological panpsychists. That‘s what "Mind in Life" means: mind and life are coextensive; life is a sufficient condition for mind. Deleuze is not just a biological panpsychist, however, so we‘ll have to confront full-fledged panpsychism. At the end of the essay we‘ll be able to pose the question whether or not we can supplement Thompson‘s “Mind in Life” position with a “Mind in Process” position and if so, what that supplement means both for his work and for panpsychism."

Read More (PDF) @ Protevi.Com

Life is a sufficient condition for 'mind' but not visa versa. I remain unconvinced by appeals to "pure experience" (William James) or "prehension" (A.N Whitehead). Instead I would like theorists to drop such silly speculative projections in a move towards a less conflating thinking of the raw potency of things. Moreover, we have to show the genesis of real experience and its complexities (e.g., the difference between perception and conception) from within experience itself (cf. Gleaning the Mesh). What the world needs now is an imaginary that intersects the bold realizations of materialism, ecology and existenz in more intelligent ways. Without a doubt I will have much more to say on this point in the future.

13.11.10

Deleuze and Societies of Control

The only info I have on the video below is here:
Liquid Theory TV is a collaboration between Clare Birchall, Gary Hall and Peter Woodbridge designed to develop a series of IPTV programmes. (IPTV, in its broadest sense, stands for all those technologies which use computer networks to deliver audio-visual programming.) The idea behind the Liquid Theory TV project is to experiment with IPTVs potential for providing new ways of communicating intellectual ideas, easily and cheaply, both inside and outside of the university. We want to do so not so much in an effort to have an impact outside of the academy, be it economic, social or cultural; nor to connect with an increasingly media-literate audience that books supposedly cannot, or can no longer, reach. Rather we want to experiment with IPTV in order to explore the potential for different effectivities that different forms of communication have - to the extent of perhaps even leading us to conceive of what we do as academics, writers, artists, media theorists and philosophers differently (see Wise, 2006: 241).
I don’t know about you, but I have 22 minutes to watch an exploration of Deleuze and the future of social control:

Deleuze’s Postscript on the Societies of Control



Read the original essay (PDF) here:

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