1.12.10

Conjuring the Gap

In a beautifully written post over at Menticulture Joe Flintham makes the following comments with regard to Graham Harman’s notion of “withdrawal”:
"I just want to dispel hidden realities which betray their appearances, or illusory facades which belie some more authentic realm... I don't want to bridge the abyss: I want to obviate the need for the bridge by unconjuring the abyss - closing the gap."
I completely agree. The world is much more intimate than the gap-conjurers would have us believe. The distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities only exists if you rely on a 17th century theory of cognition. And the distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ only appears if we privilege ocular experience over our other sensual capacities. Full-bodied human experience is neither merely visual nor reliant on some metaphysical distinct realm of the sensual in its contact with the world. What the gap-conjurers fail to appropriate is our contemporary knowledge of how human awareness is embodied, extended and deeply visceral. We directly encounter and experience other things through our bodies, through our flesh. Interacting entities are thus collisions between the inherent properties of relatively distinct objects and the capacities they individually embody. And all such 'collisions' are catalytic events with variable affects.

Such intimate contact between things is revealed everywhere. Our bodies have an ancestral continuity with stars, geological formations, bacteria, minerals, cellular communities, etc, that can afford earthly things direct access to each other. For example, objects can penetrate us and we them. Entities can be literally absorbed by us and we them. There is a dark creeping intimacy between all living and non-living beings that cannot be ontologized away. We are all of this world.

However such access is never complete. Our fleshy encounters are only partial because each entity retreats into its individuality – as realized in its material and organizational depths. The individuality of an existent being is an expression of that being’s organized extensive properties and intensive relations. And these rambling assemblages of temporal properties and relations can be said to “withdraw” into the depths of their onto-specific structural complexity, which makes it hard for us to contact or experience them in their entirety.

Likewise, ‘withdrawal’ is also only ever partial precisely because all objects/assemblages remain intertwined, embedded, supported and in contact with the world. All objects come from the same ever-present background. That is to say, all individualities are intimately of this world - emboded immanent properties and relations that can, for the most part, be touched, investigated and intervened upon given the right methods or tools. 

Take, for example, the encounter between an apple and a horse. An apple is partially ‘withdrawn’ from a horse who holds it in its teeth because the teeth of the horse are only in contact with the skin of the apple, leaving the inner non-skin parts of the apple “hidden” and temporarily in excess of the horses bite. It is in this sense that the horse can be said to be in direct contact with the real apple, but not in its entirety. There are aspects of the apple that are partially withdrawn. Yet when the horse bites into the apple a deeper kind of access is granted, and the apple’s individuality has been compromised. And when the horse subsequently begins to digest the apple the very distinction between the apple and the horse begins to break down. In this case the interaction between apple and horse seemlessly evolves from a) partial contact and withdrawnness to b) deeper disclosure and access, and eventually to c) total absorption and disintegration in a way that completely obviates the need to posit an unbridgeable ‘gap’ between either the two objects ‘in themselves’, or between the horse’s encounter with the apple and its experience of that encounter. In an intimately enmeshed and complicated cosmos these things often touch, mix and mingle in ways that are specific to what they in fact are.

Similarly, there is no good reason why we should conjure a gap between the real and the sensual. And we need only look at one more concrete example to understand why. Take, for example, when two humans interact and shake hands. When people shake hands they make direct but partial contact via their epidermal extensions (skin), while at the same time the ‘totality’ of each person’s individuality remains more rather than less ‘withdrawn’. Such contact triggers a cascade of reactions from the extensive properties and capacities of the skin throughout the body and central nervous system that eventually affects the wider self-system and governing dynamics of the individuals involved, and in very specific ways – depending on the biology, personality, memories, cultural leanings, dramaturgical background and intentions of each individual. This cascade of direct but partial contact and affective stimulation is a more or less intimate experiential event that, again, completely obviates the need to conjure up a distinct and mediating sensual realm outside of 'the real' where "vicars" bridge the gap between encounters and experience. Our worldly (actual) properties mingle directly but partially with the relatively withdrawn or undisclosed worldly (actual) properties of the other person. And the same goes with all objects. The mix and mingle (and sometimes mangle) of objects is always direct (immanent) and partial (withdrawn).

And to reiterate, in the context of the hand-shake example, just because two people contact and experience each other directly on an immanent plane of actuality, or a shared worldliness (of hand-shaking), doesn't mean that they necessarily experience each other completely (e.g., simultaneously having access to each other’s spleens, brain stems, bones, etc.). Their encounter is direct but partial precisely because there are aspects of each other’s individuality that are structurally withdrawn.

It is in this sense that I suggest objects do in fact “withdraw” but are also partially vulnerable to direct intervention and contact with other objects. There are points of contact between things even while things themselves are partially structurally withdrawn from each other.

7 comments:

joe said...

Hi michael

Thanks for responding to my post with your kind remarks! I'm very much on board with your emphasis on immanence, and am reminded of Albert Hoffman's remark that there is no objective reality separate from our nervous system. So we are in a constantly shifting ecological relationship with the world in which we are enmeshed. I'm also attracted to the notion of embodied knowing that isn't just centred on representational knowledge, but that considers touch, care and intimacy as fundamental aspects of the connection between people and things, as well as understanding and cognition. I don't yet fully understand Graham's position on vicarious causation, so need to look into that, but nevertheless find a melancholy trouble in the idea that real things in the world are hopelessly cut off from each other… an uncanny feeling at odds with the exuberance of his account of the sensuous realm.

Interesting stuff!

joe

Michael- said...

Hey Joe, thanks for stopping by.

As you seem to imply, when we take seriously the notion of 'embodied knowing' we start to move towards an understanding of extra-linguistic experience and pre-representational knowledge. Of course we wouldn't want to exclude semantic knowing in the overall package of human experience, but we shouldn't reify it or make it the core competency of human awareness either.

I think there is a strong affinity between what I want to say about embodied pre-conceptual experience and intentionality and what Heidegger had to say about being-in-the-world and Dasein’s pre-linguistic primordial “care” or concern (sorge). For me, it can all be rolled into the notion of intimacy. All beings are intimately embedded in the cosmos. You might even say, then, that I posit an Erotic cosmos (Eros) from which all things are generated, emerge from and are related.

A philosophy that argues that things are infinitely separated is not only existentially impoverished, as you suggest, but, for me, also dramatically unfounded and anti-empirical.

Michael- said...

Interesting, Steve Shaviro on occasioned societies or what i call 'relational objects':

"Whitehead says that “actual entities,” or “actual occasions,” are “the completely real things” which ultimately make up the universe. At the same time, he refers to societies (his equivalent of Delanda’s, and Deleuze/Guattari’s assemblages) as “the real actual things that endure.” The point of the difference between occasions and societies is that occasions are needed to explain the development and persistence of societies (or actual things), but societies or things cannot be reduced to the occasions that make them up in the way that physicalist analytic philosophers claim that things can be reduced to the subatomic particles or fields of which they are composed. Things or societies, of all sizes, are entirely real and irreducible."

Michael- said...

From Johnson, M. and Rohrer, T. “We Are Live Creatures: Embodiment, American Pragmatism, and the Cognitive Organism.” In Body, Language and Mind, vol. 1, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2007, pp. 17-54:

"The philosophical tradition mistakenly asks how the inside (i.e., thoughts, ideas, concepts) can represent the outside (i.e., the world). This trap is a consequence of the view that mind and body must be two ontologically different entities. On this view the problem of meaning is to explain how disembodied “internal” ideas can represent “external” physical objects and events. Several centuries have shown that given a radical mind-body dichotomy, there is no way to bridge the gap between the inner and the outer. When “mind” and “body” are regarded as two fundamentally different kinds, no third mediating thing can exist that possesses both the metaphysical character of inner, mental things and simultaneously possesses the character of the outer, physical things.

"Embodied Realism, in contrast to Representationalist theories, rejects the notion that mind and body are two ontologically distinct kinds, and it therefore rejects the attendant view that cognition and language are based on symbolic representations inside the mind of an organism that refer to some physical thing in an outside world. Instead, the terms “body” and “mind” are simply convenient shorthand ways of identifying aspects of ongoing organism-environment interactions - and so cognition and language must be understood as arising from organic processes."

Johnson and Rohrer go on to trace the rejection of this mind-body dualism from the philosopher psychologists known as the early American Pragmatists (James and Dewey) forward through recent cognitive science (such as Varela, Maturana, Edelman, Hutchins, Lakoff, Johnson, Brooks).

Johnson and Rohrerargue argue that embodied realism requires a radical reevaluation of the classical dualistic metaphysics and epistemology - especially the classical Representationalist theory of mind - and we conclude by investigating the implications for future investigations for a new, pragmatically centered cognitive science.

Michael- said...

I use the notion of intimacy as a formal term to signify both the deep embeddedness of all things in the cosmos, as well as our ability to know it (at least partially). Ontological intimacy allows us to experience the Real world directly but partially.

joe said...

michael, I've done some more riffing prompted by your description of the horse if you are interested: http://www.menticulture.com/archives/169

I'll check out the Johnson and Rohrer source, looks very promising, thanks for the tip!

joe

Michael- said...

Hell yeah I'm interested! Thanks Joe.

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