Machines of Procedure

Adrian Ivakhiv and Ian Bogost have added some tremendously useful questions and comments to the recent debate between object-orientations and process-relational thinking here.

In particular I appreciate the following comments by Bogost:

"Is it possible to see process and procedure flipsides of the same coin? Not dichotomies, but complements? If so, isn’t it possible that the machines of procedure would simply be of greater philosophical interest to some (e.g., me) than the flows of process?

For me, the becoming remains a consequence of becoming, not its nature (I called it an epiphenomenon in the paper, which furrowed at least one eyebrow). In which case, any particular flow is an accident, a singular burst. That’s why I see Whitehead the way I do. And thus my curiosity about why life implies the emergent openness that you describe."

to which Adrian responds:

"What I meant by “taking the life out of the Whiteheadian real” and putting it “somewhere else” was that the firehose analogy seems to suggest that the real stuff that makes up the world – the feeling and responding and affectivity and decision-making (all of which, for Whitehead, constitutes the actual occasions) – takes place not in the water (those actual occasions) but outside it (in the procedures that control its flow). If you take all of that out of the ‘flow’ of process, then it’s no wonder that it requires supplementation by something else (procedures). Your firehose metaphor works as a caricature and as a cautionary tale about what Whiteheadians should avoid, but it’s not what Whitehead intended.

Seeing process and procedure as flipsides or complements requires that we redefine “process” so that it doesn’t include what you’re calling “procedure.” Whitehead was more interested in developing a general metaphysic, not in analyzing specific cultural or socio-technical phenomena. Your notion of procedure is more useful for the latter. I see the challenge as figuring out how a Whiteheadian notion of process can be made to include a sensitive enough understanding of real phenomena – of different kinds of processes interconnected in complex and emergent assemblages and networks – to be helpful for making sense of real-life “matters of concern” (as Latour calls them). That’s why I find the work of Delanda, Protevi, and others like them very useful. And I find your intervention useful here as well, but I resist the idea that process needs to be supplemented by procedure. Procedure, in my view, is also processual – it develops over time, gets arranged into patterns, habits, algorithms, etc., no?"

Regarding Ian's question of "isn’t it possible that the machines of procedure would simply be of greater philosophical interest to some (e.g., me) than the flows of process?", my answer is: yes, and that's absolutely fair. To each their own. In fact, all the object-oriented folk have fascinating and thought-provoking things to say (which is why we pay attention to them in the first place), so please do keep up the good work.

But I would also ask Ian: why must we choose between them? Isn't it more pragmatic to include both process-relational insights and a respect for 'machines of procedure' in our descriptions of the world? Why would we prioritize either within our philosophical orientations?

UPDATE: Ian Bogost has responded to Adrian with the following comment:

"We have a lovely mirror-image agreement going on here. You think procedure is also processual, and I think process is also procedural!"

As usual, Ian demonstrates not only that he is a first rate interlocutor, but also that accomodating seemingly opposed views is actually fairly easy and effective. Process and Procedure - at the same time. In my experience what side of the 'same coin' we choose to orient ourselves toward is often more a matter of preference and disposition - of how we roll - rather than necessitated by the facts of the world itself.