Actualism and Derivitive Metaphysics

"As for me, I’m a good old “actualist.” For me, all that exist are specific entities of a determinate nature..." - Graham Harman

Hey, at least I agree with Graham Harman on something! All assemblages or objects are specific entities of a determinate nature - exactly. And this is precisely what I call onto-specificity.

Like Graham I also think topology is "derivitive". Which is why deriving a virtual substantiality from actual material-energetic assemblages seems to me to be a reification or hypostatisation of certain aspects or general patterns expressed by fully present sets of properties.

Capacities and powers are only generated by particular entities with specific properties in relation (in specific environments), and are not, I argue, a "potentiality" that objects withhold. The co-local manifestation of certain complex situations, networks or arrangements are catalytic events generated by the direct but partial mingling of assembled properties. Through such events, alliances or encounters each entity (or actant  as Bruno Latour calls them) contributes their onto-specific potencies (extensive and intensive properties), which are then expressed and augmented, or diminished or enhanced, affecting emergence, maintenance, perpetuation or degeneration.

Those are the broad features of what is and what can be as I understand them. Now if I can just get Harman to commit to direct-but-partial causation, all will be right with the world... ;-)

UPDATE: Graham Harman responds to this post here: "direct but partial contact"