S.C Hickman on Variations of OOO

S.C Hickman combines a fantastic prose style with precise summaries and riffs on philosophy, theory and a few other delicacies. His short insightful posts are truly an ‘object’ to behold (pun intended). Here is an excerpt of Hickman’s latest on possible differences between Graham Harman and Levi Bryant’s versions of Object-Oriented-Ontology (OOO):

The appearance of an object either to us or another object will always be partial or perspectival, for the simple reason that it reveals itself only through its intentional properties or features and does that through a negotiation and translation that is a distortion of the real objects hidden interior life. A real object is autonomous which always-already is independent and withdrawn, not fully manifested in any relationship of any type except through the interaction in that field or volcanic core where all change manifests itself. We do not need to worry over appearances, objects can be real and independent, withdrawn and sleeping and dormant without being either invisible or transparent. Objects can exist without relations; yet, as Harman has reiterated, it is only in relation that objects perceive.

I will hold off on discussing the issues of language, metaphor, hyperbole, etc. for now, except to ask why we need so many strange obfuscations of terms that seem to distort rather than clarify. By this I am referring to Levi's use of virtual proper being and local manifestation as against Harman's real and intentional objects. I see that there is a difference in emphasis here, that VPB seems to imply a potentiality; ergo., the reason for the need in equating Levi's terms to Molner's powers and properties.

Read the entire post @ Dark Chemistry

I agree with most of what Hickman is saying here. I have argued the same: why inject a term like “virtual proper being” when the notions of capacity or powers do the same work. What ‘value is added’, as my colleagues would say, by suggesting an ontological division between an assemblage’s properties and its capacities to affect? Why posit an additional virtual aspect withdrawn from the “manifest” where objects are more real than real? An object’s powers are its properties as they are expressed in relation. And because objects are never without some relations, their efficacious substantiality is constantly becoming and being expressed. The virtual, then, is simply the trace or signature, or shadow cast by the actual embodied entity.

But let me also be quite clear: with the minor exception of Bryant's use of the notion of "virtual proper being" (and even then I can see a place for such a notion just not the place Levi argues for) I think Bryant's project is an outstanding example of laser sharp intelligence, learning and insight - and a framework I very nearly agree with in its entirety.

UPDATE: Graham Harman has responded to Hickman's observations with a clarifying post of his own about the differences between Bryant's framework and his own philosophy: here. Below is an excerpt:

Levi is more sympathetic to a notion of “the virtual” than I am. Levi’s real objects don’t have qualities, whereas mine do. Among other implications, this makes him even more sympathetic than I am to the models offered by DeLanda and Bhaskar, which I admire but of which I am also critical for placing the real action outside individual entities. That’s precisely what Levi likes about them, however.